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Sebastian Edwards 
Introduction 
The 1990s were characterized by a number of spectacular currency cri- 
ses in the emerging countries. When the Mexican peso collapsed in De- 
cember 1994 most analysts believed it to be an isolated event. At most, it 
was thought, the crisis would spread to the weaker Latin American na- 
tions. The reasoning was similar in July 1997 when the Thai baht was de- 
valued and, shortly thereafter, went into a free fall. Reality differed from ex- 
pectations, however, and in a short period of time Malaysia, Indonesia, 
South Korea, and the Philippines were subject to severe speculative at- 
tacks that caused major devaluations, deep recessions, and costly adjust- 
ment processes. By then it had become increasingly apparent that emerg- 
ing countries were subject to “contagion,” and that currency crises could 
rapidly move from country to country. 
By  early  1998 market participants were asking themselves where the 
next crisis would erupt. Russia and Brazil, with large fiscal deficits and 
overvalued exchange rates, were obvious candidates and eventually joined 
the ranks of nations in crisis. The Russian default was particularly trau- 
matic, sending investors throughout the world scrambling for cover and 
inflicting heavy losses on a number of large financial institutions. As a re- 
sult of this crisis, interest rate spreads widened significantly, seriously strain- 
ing the financial markets in the United  States and other industrialized 
countries. 
The Russian and Brazilian crises represented a severe blow to the credi- 
Sebastian Edwards is the Henry Ford I1 Professor of International Economics at the An- 
derson Graduate School of Management, University of California, Los Angeles, and a re- 
search associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
1 2  Sebastian Edwards 
bility of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In both cases the IMF 
publicly defended policies-overvalued  exchange rates in the light of large 
fiscal imbalances-that  were deemed clearly inappropriate by the vast ma- 
jority of private sector and academic analysts, and that eventually proved 
to be flawed. In both cases the IMF put together, a few weeks before the 
final collapse, large rescue packages that turned out to be vastly insuffi- 
cient. While in the case of Brazil the postcrisis period turned out to be less 
traumatic than many analysts had anticipated, crisis management contin- 
ues to be one of the most pressing issues in modern macroeconomic an- 
alysis. 
Large capital flows have been at the heart of each one of these crisis 
episodes. The stories are, in fact, remarkably similar: Attracted by  high 
domestic  interest  rates  and  rosy  prospects,  large  volumes  of  foreign 
funds-mostly  in the form of portfolio capital-moved  into these econo- 
mies, propelling  stock market booms and helping finance large current 
account deficits. At some point, and for a variety of reasons, these funds 
slowed down or were reversed. This change in conditions required signif- 
icant  corrections  in  macroeconomic  policies.  Invariably,  however,  the 
adjustment was delayed or was  insufficient, increasing the level of un- 
certainty and the degree of country risk. As a result, increasingly large 
volumes of capital left the country and international reserves dropped to 
dangerously low levels. Eventually the pegged exchange rate had to be 
abandoned and the country was forced to float the currency. In some 
cases, such as those of Brazil and Russia, a runaway fiscal deficit made 
the situation even more explosive. 
For many years, “official capital” dominated capital inflows into the de- 
veloping countries. During the 1960s, 1970s, and most of the 1980s, private 
capital was restricted to foreign direct investment. Moreover, the condi- 
tions under which foreign direct investment was allowed into these coun- 
tries were severely regulated by the authorities. This situation changed dra- 
matically in the early 1990s when, as a result of the broad implementation 
of  market-oriented reforms, an increasingly large number  of countries 
opened up their economies to international competition. The sense that 
these countries had a bright economic future resulted in massive private 
portfolio inflows. Innovation in financial markets in the United States and 
Europe-including  the proliferation  of  mutual funds-also  contributed 
to the increase of capital flows into the emerging economies. After the fall 
of the Berlin Wall in 1989 the countries in the former Soviet Union joined 
the world economy and demanded large volumes of capital to restructure 
their productive sectors. The industrial countries responded promptly, and 
large flows of capital moved into a region of the world that for decades 
had been isolated from global financial markets. 
Almost  a decade after private flows became  the dominant source of 
foreign funds in the emerging economies, experts continue to debate the Introduction  3 
effects of increased capital mobility. For example, in the aftermath of the 
East Asian, Russian, and Brazilian crises a number of observers have ar- 
gued that the free mobility of capital had increased the degree of vulnera- 
bility of the emerging economies, making them more prone to externally 
triggered crises. Some have  argued  that  the imposition  of  controls on 
(short-term) capital inflows could help avoid major crises-or,  at least, 
reduce their magnitude. Advocates of this approach have invoked Chile’s 
experience with capital controls since 1991 to support their views. For ex- 
ample, Joseph Stiglitz, the World Bank’s chief economist, had been quoted 
by  the New  York Times (1 February  1998) as saying, “You want to look 
for policies that discourage hot money but facilitate the flow of long-term 
loans, and there is evidence that the Chilean approach or some version of 
it, does this.” Michel Camdessus, the IMF’s managing director, has re- 
cently endorsed the view that capital controls should only be lifted toward 
the end of a market-oriented reform effort. In an interview in the Financial 
Times (9 February 1998) he said, “We need to be audacious but sensitive. 
We  need to push ahead with capital flow liberalisation but in an orderly 
manner” (1). He added, “The last thing you must liberalise is the very 
short term capital movements” (13). 
A number  of authors have pointed out that in the face of increased 
private capital mobility, banking supervision and regulation become cru- 
cially important. Poorly regulated banks will intermediate the inflows of 
capital in an inefficient or even corrupt way, increasing the probability of 
a systemic financial crisis (Calvo 1998). 
It has long been recognized that legal impediments to capital mobility 
are not always franslated into actual restrictions on these movements. This 
distinction between actual and legal capital mobility has affected econo- 
mists’ ability to measure the “true” degree of financial integration in spe- 
cific countries and has been at the center of recent debates on the effec- 
tiveness of  capital controls. Some authors have followed Feldstein  and 
Horioka (1980) and have relied on the correlation  (or lack thereof) be- 
tween savings and investment as a measurement of the degree to which 
capital markets in different countries are integrated. Other authors have 
concentrated on interest rate differentials in trying to determine whether 
a particular country is actually integrated  into world financial markets 
(Dooley, Mathieson, and Rojas-Suarez 1997). 
More recently, some authors have used information contained in the 
IMF’s Exchange Rate and Monetary Arrangements to construct indexes 
on capital controls for a panel of  countries. Alesina, Grilli, and Milesi- 
Ferretti (1994), for example, constructed a dummy variable index of capi- 
tal controls. This indicator-which  takes a value of one when capital con- 
trols are in place and zero otherwise-was  then used to analyze some of 
the political forces behind the imposition of capital restrictions in a score 
of countries. Rodrik (1998) used a similar index to investigate the effects 4  Sebastian Edwards 
of capital controls on growth, inflation, and investment between 1979 and 
1989. Rodrik’s (1998) work is based on the empirical growth literature and 
suggests that, after controlling for other variables, capital restrictions have 
no significant effects on macroeconomic performance. 
A serious limitation of these IMF-based indexes, however, is that they 
are extremely general and do not distinguish between different intensities 
of capital restrictions, nor do they distinguish between the type of flow 
that is being restricted. For example, according to this IMF-based indi- 
cator, Chile, Mexico, and Brazil were subject to the same degree of capital 
controls in  1992-94.  In reality, however, the three cases were extremely 
different. Whereas Chile had restrictions on short-term inflows, Mexico 
(for all practical  purposes) had free capital mobility and Brazil had in 
place an arcane array of restrictions. These measurement difficulties are 
not unique to the capital flows literature, however. In fact, as Edwards 
(1993, 1998) and Rodrik (1995) have argued, the literature on trade open- 
ness and growth has long been affected by serious measurement problems. 
Constructing comprehensive and high-quality comparative measures of 
openness has indeed proved to be extremely elusive. A major challenge in 
empirically oriented work on capital flows, international trade, and eco- 
nomic performance is to generate results that are robust  to alternative 
measures  of capital mobility and trade restrictions.  Future work along 
these lines should recognize, at the outset, that these indexes are likely to 
be  subject to measurement error, and that there is a need to strive for 
robustness in the empirical analysis. 
The increase in capital flows into the emerging markets during the first 
half of the 1990s helped generate significant stock market booms and al- 
lowed  these  countries  to  increase  aggregate  expenditure  substantially. 
This, in turn, generated pressure on domestic prices and large real ex- 
change rate appreciations (Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart 1993). A num- 
ber  of analysts have argued that these real exchange rate appreciations 
induced by capital inflows have tended to reduce the country’s degree of 
international competitiveness, and that they may eventually result in an 
external crises and in a reversal of market-oriented reforms. As a result, 
some authors have argued that capital controls should be lifted only at the 
end of a reform effort (McKinnon 1991).’ 
The recent experiences on the part of emerging markets of large private 
inflows have generated a series of important questions: 
What is the appropriate exchange rate regime for a developing or transi- 
Does free capital mobility increase a small country’s degree of financial 
tional country in a world with massive capital mobility? 
vulnerability? 
1. This, of course, is the “sequencing of reform” debate Introduction  5 
How do countries respond once capital flows reverse and a crisis erupts? 
What is the nature of “contagion”? 
Following a crisis, does foreign direct investment welfare improve matters 
or does “fire-sale FDI” have a detrimental effect on poor countries? 
What has been the behavior of financial market indicators in periods fol- 
lowing a financial liberalization? 
What has been the role of Japan in the unfolding of the East Asian crisis? 
What have been the causes behind the massive capital flows to Eastern 
To  what extent are risk considerations reflected in the bond spreads of 
How do capital flows behave in the aftermath of the opening of the capi- 
How effective are controls on capital inflows? 
Europe and the former Soviet Union? 
emerging markets? 
tal account? 
The papers collected in this volume were presented at a National Bureau 
of Economic Research conference entitled Capital Inflows to Developing 
Countries held in  Cambridge,  Massachusetts,  on 20-2  1 February  1998; 
the conference papers addressed many of the questions posed above. In 
preparing this volume I have divided the papers into three groups. The 
first part deals with different theoretical  aspects of capital inflows into 
emerging economies and includes papers by Guillermo A. Calvo and En- 
rique G. Mendoza, Paul Krugman, and Philippe Bacchetta and Eric van 
Wincoop. The second part deals with broad cross-country empirical as- 
pects of capital mobility and includes papers by  Barry Eichengreen and 
Ashoka  Mody, Swati Ghosh and Holger  Wolf, and Geert Bekaert and 
Campbell R. Harvey. The third part deals with capital inflows to Latin 
America, Asia, and Eastern Europe and includes papers by me, Takatoshi 
Ito, and Stijn Claessens, Daniel Oks, and Rossana Polastri. In addition, 
I have included discussants’ comments. In the rest of this introduction I 
provide a reader’s guide to the volume. 
Capital Flows to Developing Countries: Theoretical Aspects 
The first paper in this section, “Contagion, Globalization, and the Vola- 
tility of Capital Flows” by Guillermo Calvo and Enrique Mendoza, deals 
with contagion, investors’ herd behavior, and the costs of gathering infor- 
mation in a globalized financial market. The authors argue that in a world 
with increased capital mobility, optimal portfolio diversification results in 
a higher degree of financial volatility. According to them, as the global 
capital market grows, so does the probability of “contagion.” The authors 
develop a model of an integrated global financial market with a large num- 
ber  of  countries and a (very) large number  of identical investors. The 
model assumes that there are costs of gathering and processing informa- 6  Sebastian Edwards 
tion  regarding  specific country’s performance,  and  that  investors-or, 
more specifically, asset managers-incur  a cost if  their portfolio under- 
performs the market portfolio. The authors show that, within the context 
of their model, the benefits of acquiring country-specific information de- 
clines as the number of countries in the global portfolio increases. This 
means that, with a portfolio with a large enough number of countries, it 
may not pay to verify “rumors”; as a consequence, it is possible for the 
world financial markets to experience rumor-initiated contagion. Accord- 
ing to the Calvo-Mendoza model, if  asset managers face variable perfor- 
mance incentives and the number of  countries in  the world portfolio is 
large, it is possible to observe herd behavior. More specifically, it is pos- 
sible that all investors simultaneously reallocate their portfolios, generat- 
ing massive capital flows in and out of the emerging markets. In the last 
section of their paper Calvo and Mendoza calibrate their model and pres- 
ent a number of simulation exercises. The most interesting ones relate to 
the case of  Mexico. According to their model, if  the costs of  gathering 
Mexico-specific information is 6.5 percent, a rumor that reduces the ex- 
pected return on Mexico’s equities to that of the member countries of the 
Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development  (OECD) 
could result in a reduction in foreigners’ holdings of Mexican equities of 
40 percent of the total. In terms of  1997 levels this would have exceeded 
US$20 billion, a figure similar to Mexico’s  holdings of international  re- 
serves. Their simulations also suggest that even if the number of countries 
in the global portfolio is  as low  as twenty, herding panics can generate 
very large outflows. Their calculation is that in 1997 these flows could have 
exceeded US$25 billion. 
In “Fire-Sale FDI” Paul Krugman develops a model to investigate the 
nature of capital flows in the aftermath of a currency crisis in a developing 
country. The point of departure is the observation that a crisis is usually 
followed by two-way capital flows. On the one hand, short-term portfolio 
(“hot”) capital flows  out; on the other, foreign direct investment (FDI) 
flows in, as foreigners try to take advantage of new opportunities to buy 
local firms. The aim of this paper is twofold: first to provide some theoreti- 
cal explanation for the currency crises of the 1990s, and second to evaluate 
the welfare implications of what Krugman terms “fire-sale FDI.” Krug- 
man argues that from a conceptual point of view there are two possible 
explanations of the recent East Asian currency crises. One is based on the 
moral hazard-overborrowing  argument, while the other is based on the 
classical liquidity crisis theory. According to Krugman the exact nature of 
postcrisis FDI depends on the causes of the currency collapse. If, on the 
other hand, the crisis is caused by  moral-hazard-induced overborrowing, 
the decline in the price of domestic assets would allow foreigners to take 
control over them. In this case foreigners represent the most “efficient” 
possible operator of the asset in question, and the crisis would imply that Introduction  7 
control over the asset is reallocated to the most efficient party. If the crisis 
is the result of a liquidity-generated panic, the foreign party-which  is not 
liquidity constrained-has  the opportunity of taking over domestic assets. 
According to Krugman, in this case fire sales will usually transfer control 
over to firms that are less efficient than the domestic firm. An important 
feature of fire sales that arises independently of the nature of the crisis is 
that, by limiting the fall in asset prices, they have a stabilizing effect in the 
crisis country. 
The third paper in this section of the volume, “Capital Flows to Emerg- 
ing Markets: Liberalization, Overshooting, and Volatility,” is by  Philippe 
Bacchetta and Eric van Wincoop and deals with the impact of financial 
liberalization on the dynamic of capital flows. The starting point of this 
paper is the observation that in most developing countries capital flows 
appear to overshoot in the period  following the opening of  the capital 
account. This has been the case even if the capital account is opened up 
only partially. According to the authors, the analysis of capital flows dy- 
namics will provide a better understanding of the issue of capital account 
sustainability. They argue that  optimal policy responses would be very 
different if  lending surges are short-term booms rather  than long-term 
sustainable trends. In order to address this issue Bacchetta and van Win- 
coop develop a portfolio model with a large number of developed and 
developing  countries.  Individuals  in  emerging  countries  invest  locally, 
while individuals in advanced countries can diversify internationally. It is 
further assumed that initially the developing countries impose a tax on 
foreign investors, and that there is an installation cost of capital. The au- 
thors solve the portfolio allocation problem and analyze the way in which 
a reduction in the tax on foreign investors affects the dynamics of capital 
flows into the developing countries. According to their model, following a 
once-and-for-all financial liberalization capital inflows will  immediately 
jump,  overshooting their  (new) long-term level. The magnitude  of the 
overshooting will depend on the importance of the installation cost. The 
larger this cost, the smaller the overshooting. Bacchetta and van Wincoop 
calibrate their model and perform a number of  simulation exercises. In 
their first exercise they assume that the initial tax on foreign investors is 
equal to 5 percent and that it is reduced exponentially through time. In 
order to gain additional insights into the effects of liberalization, they ana- 
lyze the case when only one country liberalizes as well as the case in which 
all developing countries liberalize simultaneously. They find that in both 
cases capital inflows will be characterized by an overshooting. Next, Bac- 
chetta and van Wincoop extend their model to the case where there is 
imperfect information and learning. They show that in this instance liber- 
alization processes will be characterized by high volatility and, under some 
circumstances, by  contagion. 8  Sebastian Edwards 
Capital Flows to the Emerging Markets: 
Evidence from Cross-country Analyses 
The three papers included in this second part of the volume use vast 
volumes of cross-country data to investigate a number of important issues 
related to capital flows into the emerging countries. In “What Explains 
Changing Spreads on Emerging Market Debt?” Barry Eichengreen and 
Ashoka Mody use data on more than thirteen hundred bond issues in de- 
veloping countries to analyze the factors behind bond spreads. Their anal- 
ysis differs from previous work in several respects. First, they cover a pe- 
riod (1  99 1-97)  when bond financing had become very important in many 
emerging countries. Second, their sample covers every region in the world, 
whereas most of the previous literature did not incorporate data from Af- 
rica. And third, the data set includes bonds issued by both the private and 
the public sector. In this paper, Eichengreen and Mody analyze both the 
country’s decision to issue a bond as well as the determinants of bonds’ 
spreads. By  looking at both aspects of the problem, potential selectivity 
biases are avoided. The results obtained suggest that the decision to issue 
a bond is affected by  both demand and supply considerations. Some of 
the most interesting results are that issues tend to increase when interest 
rates  on U.S. treasury bonds decline, that  more creditworthy countries 
tend to issue more frequently, and that countries with higher debt have a 
lower probability  of  issuing bonds. The  spreads analysis  suggests that 
there are differences across regions, in particular between Latin America 
and the rest of the sample. For Latin America  the results suggest that 
larger issues command smaller spreads and that private issues on average 
have hightr spreads when controlling for other factors. Eichengreen and 
Mody use their vast data set to analyze whether changes in spreads on 
emerging nations’ bonds have been the result of changing fundamentals 
or whether they have responded to changing “sentiments.” They found, 
somewhat to their surprise, that changes in spreads during the first half of 
1997 had been related to changes in “sentiments” that were largely unre- 
lated to fundamentals. 
In their paper “Is There a Curse of Location? Spatial Determinants of 
Capital Flows to Emerging Markets,” Swati Ghosh and Holger Wolf use 
a cross-country data set to investigate the geographical distribution of cap- 
ital flows to developing countries. The authors point out that capital flows 
have largely been concentrated in a small group of countries in East Asia 
and Latin America, and they ask whether this phenomenon is a reflection 
of the recipient countries’ fundamentals or whether geography plays a role 
in the allocation of capital flows across countries. In order to investigate 
this issue the authors estimate a series of equations taken from the inter- 
national trade “gravity models” literature. According to gravity models 
(bilateral) trade is largely explained by the proximity-or  lack thereof- Introduction  9 
of a pair of countries: countries that are closer to each other have a larger 
volume of trade than do countries that are farther apart. Ghosh and Wolf 
begin their analysis by discussing possible reasons why the gravity models 
applicable to trade would also apply to capital mobility. In the actual esti- 
mation they distinguish between three types of capital flows: bank lending, 
short-term finance, and what they call “capital market,” which includes 
syndicated loans and bond issues. Their findings indicate that location is 
related to the ability of emerging markets to have access to these three 
different forms of foreign financing. They also find that gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita is  the only variable other than distance that 
helps explain capital flows. According to the authors, these results help 
explain why Africa has traditionally had limited access to capital markets. 
In their paper “Capital Flows and the Behavior of Emerging Market 
Equity Returns,” Geert Bekaert and Campbell Harvey analyze in  great 
detail the relation between U.S. equity flows to emerging markets and both 
the behavior of these countries’ capital markets, equity returns, and ex- 
change rates, and the structural characteristics of the economies. They use 
data on seventeen emerging countries for the period 1977-96  to investigate 
break points in net equity flows from the United States to each of  these 
countries. These break points are estimated endogenously using the actual 
time series for capital flows. The authors argue that these estimated break 
points correspond  to  the time when  foreign investor’s attitudes  to the 
emerging countries experienced a significant change and, thus, can be la- 
beled as the dates when the financial liberalization actually occurred. The 
next  step of the analysis consists  of  investigating the behavior  of four 
groups of financial indicators during the periods preceding and following 
each of the break points. These indicators are related to (1) the cost of 
capital, (2) market structure, (3) characteristics  of the economy, and (4) 
country risk. An important point made by this paper is that, in principle, 
using changes in legislation to date capital market liberalization may result 
in misleading results. Bekaert and Harvey’s analysis suggests that in six- 
teen out of the seventeen countries in their sample, foreign ownership of 
stocks increased significantly after the break point. Some of the paper’s 
most important results include the following: (1) On average, the dividend 
yield declined from approximately 4.3 percent to 2.5 percent in the period 
following the break point; (2) average ex  post  returns declined from 20 
percent  to  13.4 percent  in  the postliberalization  period;  (3) individual 
countries’ ps increased significantly after the liberalization period but re- 
mained, on average, below 0.5; (4) there are small declines on average vola- 
tility (both conditional and ex post) in the period after the liberalization; 
(5) the number of listed stocks increases after the liberalization, as does 
market  capitalization;  (6) average GDP growth  increases  very  slightly 
after the break points; and (7) after the break points, there is a significant 
increase in the degree of openness of these economies. 10  Sebastian Edwards 
Capital Flows to Latin America, Asia, and Eastern Europe 
The last three chapters in the volume investigate in great detail the re- 
gional experiences with capital inflows in Latin America, Asia, and East- 
ern Europe. 
In “Capital Flows, Real Exchange Rates, and Capital Controls: Some 
Latin American Experiences,” I analyze capital flows to Latin America. 
The paper concentrates on five  broad  areas: (1) a historical  analysis of 
capital flows trends; (2) the relationship  between capital flows and real 
exchange rates in the Latin American countries; (3)  capital flows and the 
ability to engage in independent monetary policy; (4) the role of the bank- 
ing sector in recent Latin American  currency crises; and (5) the role of 
capital controls in Latin America. The historical analysis highlights the 
cyclical nature of  capital flows to the region during the last twenty five 
years. During this period Latin America has gone through a number of 
borrowing booms followed by major crises. An interesting aspect of this 
history, however, is that in the more recent period international investors 
appear to be more willing to distinguish between different Latin American 
countries. While the debt crisis of 1982 affected every country, the Mex- 
ican crisis of  1994 basically spared some of the countries with stronger 
fundamentals. Although  it  is too  early  to pass  definitive judgment,  it 
would seem that the Brazilian crisis of 1999 will also have limited impact 
on the region. In discussing the historical record, I deal with a number of 
analytical and policy controversies, including the measurement of capital 
mobility and the adequate sequencing of  liberalization in the emerging 
economies.,I analyze in detail the effect of capital inflows on real exchange 
rate behavior in a group of Latin American countries and find that capital 
flows have Granger-caused real exchange rate appreciations in most of 
these countries. My results also suggest that almost every one of the Latin 
nations has tried to sterilize large capital inflows in an effort to maintain 
greater control over monetary policy. These efforts, however, have been 
rather unsuccessful. My analysis of capital controls concentrates on re- 
strictions to capital inflows and pays particular attention to the Chilean 
system, which consists of taxing short-term capital. I point out that this 
approach has been significantly less effective than most casual analysts 
have argued. In particular, the Chilean system has not succeeded in reduc- 
ing the extent of real exchange rate appreciation, nor has it given the cen- 
tral bank a greater degree of control over monetary policy. 
In “Capital Flows in Asia,” Takatoshi Ito presents a detailed analysis 
of the behavior of capital flows in that region and gives an interpretation 
of the events that led to the East Asian crisis of 1997. A fascinating aspect 
of this paper is that it provides a clear and persuasive interpretation  of 
Japan’s role in this episode. According to Ito, until 1996 the emerging East 
Asian countries were subject to a virtuous cycle that was sustained by  a Introduction  11 
great sense of optimism about the future of the region and financed with 
very large capital flows, mostly coming from Japan. In late 1996, the virtu- 
ous cycle was interrupted, as exports from East Asia declined sharply. 
Both Japan’s recession and the depreciation of the yen played an impor- 
tant role in the unfolding of these events. The East Asian currency crises 
in mid-1997 made things worse, as they were followed by substantial cuts 
in capital flows into the region. Ito investigates in detail the way in which 
Japanese FDI and the behavior of the yen affected growth in the emerging 
East Asian countries. His results indicate that changes in FDI from Japan 
have an important effect on the region’s rate of growth, with a one-year 
lag. More specifically, according to Ito’s estimates, the effect of changes in 
Japanese FDI on growth is twice that of FDI from the United States. 
The final chapter in the volume is “Capital Flows to Central and East- 
ern Europe and the Former Soviet Union” and is co-authored  by  Stijn 
Claessens, Daniel  Oks, and Rossana  Polastri. They concentrate on the 
period 1991-97  and investigate the way in which different forms of capital 
flows evolved during that period. While in the early years (1991-93)  FDI 
was almost the only type of flow into the region, starting in 1993 portfolio 
flows became increasingly important. According to the authors the in- 
crease in flows to the region has been the result of a series of intercon- 
nected factors, including a reduction in perceived country risk in most of 
these countries and the expectations that some of  them would join the 
European Union. The authors argue that official flows-mostly  from the 
multilateral institutions-have  played an important role in helping pave 
the way for the structural reforms undertaken by  the East European na- 
tions. The authors provide detailed analyses of the way in which the Czech 
Republic, Poland, Estonia, Hungary, and Russia responded to the large 
capital inflows of the mid-1990s. The paper ends with cautionary note 
regarding the potential dangers of fiscal imbalances and of low-quality 
financial intermediation. In retrospect, and in light of the Russian debacle 
of August 1998, these remarks appear to have had an element of premo- 
nition. 
Concluding Remarks 
The papers collected in  this volume deal with a wide array of issues 
related to capital inflows to developing countries. They provide historical 
and empirical analyses of some of the most important issues. The theoreti- 
cal models presented here throw new  light on important questions, and 
some of the regional studies point toward unresolved issues. These papers 
also suggest areas for future research. Among the most important of these 
is optimal exchange rate regimes in a world with capital mobility. This 
issue has acquired particular interest in the aftermath of the Brazilian cri- 
sis of 1999 and the debate on Argentina’s potential dollarization. A second 12  Sebastian Edwards 
important topic concerns controls on capital mobility-in  particular on 
capital inflows-and  their effects on the emerging economies. More spe- 
cifically, it is important to  investigate whether this type of restriction helps 
countries reduce their degree of  financial vulnerability. Issues related to 
contagion and the channels through which it manifests itself are also im- 
portant, as are questions dealing with the sequencing and speed of liberal- 
ization. Finally, it appears that in spite of tremendous progress during the 
last few years, the economic profession still does not understand fully the 
anatomy of currency crises. Additional research in that area will certainly 
be welcomed. 
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